求全球金融危机的英文报告,要2000字
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发布时间：2022-04-23 09:20
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热心网友
时间：2023-07-12 00:53
by Nicholas A. Vardy
Here we are yet again in the midst of another "global economic crisis." From the hilltops of Davos, Switzerland, Morgan Stanley's permabear Stephen Roach has shouted warnings of potential economic "Armageddon." Superinvestor George Soros designated the current state of the global economy "the worst market crisis in 60 years." Bill Clinton labeled it "the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression" —— even as global stocks responded by slumping 7.7% in January —— the worst start to an investing year since Morgan Stanley began publishing data in the 1970s.
But before you liquidate your financial assets, buy gold bullion, and move to a cave in Montana, you may wish to consider that current predictions of global economic collapse may be simply hyperbole. It has happened before. Clinton's quote above actually refers to the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 —— right before NASDAQ clocked an 88% gain in 1999. Nor does this global crisis stand up to the scrutiny of historic comparison. Remember the S&L crisis in the early '80s? It cost the U.S. economy about 3.5% of GDP —— about 5x the size of subprime write-offs so far. Or how about the dark days of 1981, when the Federal Reserve drove its key interest rate to 19% in an effort to whip inflation? Bill Clinton's "Great Depression of 1998" doesn't even merit mention.
Global Financial Crisis: The Current State of Play
Comparing economic statistics is inevitably a "glass is half empty" versus "glass is half full" kind of game. Both Pollyannas and Cassandras can marshal endless statistics to support their version of events. But since it's the Cassandras' views that are the flavor of the day, let's look at some "glass is half full" statistics on the U.S. economy.
Companies in the U.S. private sector added 130,000 jobs in January and the unemployment rate eased to 4.9%. The Institute for Supply Management's index of manufacturing activity rose to 50.7 in January —— back above the 50 threshold that indicates expansion consistent with GDP growth of roughly 2%. Nearly 93% （!） of purchasing managers said that turmoil in financial markets was having no effect on their companies' ability to obtain regular or additional financing. That situation indicates that the turmoil is restricted to Wall Street and subprime households.
True, that after rip roaring performances in Q2 and Q3, the U.S. economy has stumbled. But a look behind the headline numbers is revealing. Good news came from the consumer sector （spending increased by 2%）, business investment （jumping 7.5%）, and exports （up 3.9%）. It was declines in residential investment （down 23.9%） and in inventory investment that almost wiped out those gains. All of this indicates that the economy stands less at the precipice of the next Great Depression than at a cyclical purging of excesses —— particularly in the housing sector.
Global Financial Crisis: Professor Bernanke's Report Card
Aware that the financial crisis could spread to other sectors, the Fed has moved remarkably aggressively, cutting rates by 1.25 percentage points in eight days —— a rate-cutting spree almost unheard of in central banking history. The Fed now has cut rates five times by a cumulative 2.25 percentage points —— and there is no sign that the Fed is done. Thanks to the maneuverings of Hank Paulson, George Bush soon will sign a bill that will pump some $150 billion into the American economy for U.S. consumers to spend. That kind of coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities is as unprecedented as it is both prompt and impressive.
Sure, the Cassandras are vilifying the Fed's actions. Bernanke has been criticized for everything from pandering to Wall Street traders to still being behind the curve. But opinions are like a nose —— everybody has one. The current din of criticism against Bernanke is a lot like baseball fans, screaming "throw the bum out" at the game or venting their frustrations on post-game AM radio talk shows. But it's a lot easier to criticize than to step up to home plate and swing the bat. The reality is that few of Bernanke's most vitriolic critics were even smart enough to make it into an introctory economics class taught by Bernanke at Princeton —— let alone to run the world's most influential Central Bank. And to assume that Fed policy is based on responses to such criticism would be as absurd as for baseball star Alex Rodriguez to walk over and hand his bat to an obnoxious, beer-swilling critic in the bleachers of Yankee Stadium to take his place at home plate. Thankfully, airline pilots guiding a plane through rough turbulence play to a less vociferous crowd.
Here's the reality. Neither Bernanke's interest rate cuts nor the federal stimulus package likely will hit the policy nail right on the head. But no real-time decision making is perfect. As John Maynard Keynes, himself an academic with plenty of real world experience, observed: "It's better to be approximately right than exactly wrong." The Fed can't stop a downturn, but it can help it be short and shallow. This is a complex, fast-changing situation. Let's give the Fed and the U.S. government some credit for acting swiftly and decisively.
Global Financial Crisis: The Investment Strategy of the World's Top Traders
So are things really that bad? What has gotten lost in the din is that credit markets have returned to normal. Foreclosures are at record levels, but aren't as numerous as originally forecast. And even if policy responses by the Fed only slow the rate of decline in U.S. housing prices, that alone will already have a dramatic impact on U.S. economic growth. And the Fed has shown that it is willing to act quickly to reverse course and hike interest rates once it is clear that the economy is through this bout of weakness.
Uncertainty means that it is reasonable to pull your horns in a bit —— and diversify away from stocks, emphasizing a diverse group of assets that are less correlated to the stock market. The top hedge managers I know are more focused on playing defense until the st settles. The most bullish signal is that investors are almost uniformly bearish. And it is precisely ring periods of panic that the greatest fortunes are made.
标签：2008全球金融危机, The Global Financial Crisis Of 2008, 金融危机英语
热心网友
时间：2023-07-12 00:54
Navigating the Global Credit Crisis
JPM
US High Grade Strategy Eric Beinstein, Andrew Scott, Trang Le
High grade bond spreads are very wide and are likely to tighten over time e in part to
the recent Treasury measures, but investors should await resolution on the fate of
several large Financials before adding to positions. Transparency around asset pricing
coming from the expected Treasury auctions will be positive for the firms which have
reserved and marked conservatively, negative for those who have not.
Credit Derivatives Strategy Eric Beinstein, Andrew Scott, Trang Le
Near term the market is working through the impact of the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac
and Lehman credit events, which will likely all be successfully settled over the next
month. Longer term changes are likely in CDS market structure, regulation, contract
terms and the nature of market participants.
Short Term Fixed Income Alex Roever, Cie-Jae Brown
ABCP facility will provide an enormous amount of liquidity to both money funds and
the broader money markets, effectively opening the discount window to money market
funds and providing the ability to immediately liquidate ABCP. ABCP yields should
now be less than yields on unsecured bank paper.
US Banks, Finance and Securities Ian Jaffe, Matthew Hughart
US depositories and other financial institutions to be significant beneficiaries of Treasury
asset purchase plan should the plan incorporate pricing levels that focus on ‘discounted
cash flow’ methodologies primarily. Most challenged exposures are loans, not securities.
US Insurance Companies Arun Kumar, Brett Gibson
Valuations have declined precipitously but barring a few glaring and notable exceptions
such as AIG, the Monolines and the mortgage insurers, credit ratings have not been
impacted. Take advantage of the current wide levels in the life sector while remaining
Neutral on the P&C sector.
ABS and CDOs Chris Flanagan, Edward Reardon, Amy Sze
TARP supports the value proposition in residential and commercial mortgages. We
would look for purchase prices by Treasury to be well above today’s market prices and
closer to the model prices we determine through model-based cash flow valuations.
US High Yield Strategy Peter Acciavatti, Nelson Jantzen
Spreads for high yield bonds and loans will once again exceed last week’s bottom as the
credit cycle progresses and defaults increase more substantially in 2009. We continue
to only recommend BB-rated bonds and loans. Many loan-only, second-lien, and
covenant-lite issuers still have a great deal of default risk to price in.
European Credit Strategy Stephen Dulake
Treasury’s actions arguably enable a refocus back to fundamentals, valuations and
technicals. We expect to see sellers of risk, either from conventional (new issues) or
unconventional (deleveraging) sources. Fade rallies and stay underweight subordinated
banks, Tier 1 in particular.
Emerging Markets Corporate Strategy Victoria Miles, Warren Mar
Stay underweight EM corporates bonds, which have widened by 110bp since early
September. We see particular risks in China property companies, Korean banks and
Russian financials.
The past two weeks have been extraordinary in financial
markets. US Fed and Treasury have unveiled a sweeping
plan, the $700 billion TARP (Trouble Asset Relief
Program), to address the financial crisis in a comprehensive
manner, capping a series of ad hoc interventions.
Congressional approval of this package is likely in the
coming days. Downside risks for most banks and brokers
has been reced and transparency around asset pricing
coming from the expected Treasury auctions will be
positive for firms, which have reserved and marked
conservatively. We recommend staying in higher quality
assets, which stand to benefit the most. Prime money funds,
which play a central role in how financial institutions fund
themselves, now have access to an enormous amount of
liquidity. ABCP yields should now be less than yields on
unsecured paper. For non-agency residential mortgage and
commercial mortgage securitization markets, the TARP is
unequivocally positive and goes a long way towards
establishing a floor for mortgage-related prices. High grade
bond spreads remain at record wide levels and are likely to
tighten over time, but first there may be more spread
widening as pressure on the weaker Financials intensifies
However, the macro consequences of the policy changes
have yet to play out, with initial estimates by JPMorgan
that the total net issuance of public sector debt in the
coming fiscal year could approach $1.5 trillion, about
10% of GDP. While market conditions are better relative to
where we stood last week, it’s difficult to make the case that
taking the past three weeks as a whole financial conditions
are more supportive of growth. The fate of several large
financial firms remains to be resolved and further writedowns
still need to be taken. The Treasury’s actions supports
the value proposition for the top of the capital structure, but
our core views on higher-beta markets, including US high
yield and leveraged loans, European high yield and emerging
markets credit are little changed. European companies are
more operationally leveraged than they were in 2001-2002
and we expect greater deleveraging and would fade rallies.
US high yield bonds and loans will likely retest last week’s
lows as default volumes rise, borrowing conditions remain
difficult and ratings downgrades persist. EM corporates have
been severely hit in the recent sell-off, with the Corporate
Emerging Markets Bond Index (CEMBI), now 125bp wider
than early September, and we stay underweightEM corporate
bonds across regions. We recently lowered our 2009 growth
forecasts and expect EM growth to slow below potential in
2009 in Latin America, the CEEMEA region and in EM Asia
(ex-China and India).
热心网友
时间：2023-07-12 00:54
Maurice R. Greenberg
(Mr. Greenberg is Chairman of The Nixon Center and Chairman and CEO of American International Group.)
Foreword
The global financial crisis has clearly become a leading foreign policy priority of the Clinton Administration. Few people are as qualified to evaluate the crisis, its consequences for the United States, and possible solutions as Maurice R. Greenberg. As the Chairman and CEO of American International Group, an insurance and financial services firm that does business in 130 countries, and a former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mr. Greenberg has enormous first-hand knowledge of the world economy.
Mr. Greenberg, who is also Chairman of The Nixon Center, originally presented his highly informative and thoughtful remarks ring the October 7, 1998 session of the Study Group on America as the Sole Superpower, chaired by Senator John McCain (R-AZ). Organized under the auspices of The Nixon Center, the Study Group is a small, top-level bipartisan panel which includes key members of Congress, former senior officials – among them former Secretaries of State and Defense and four National Security Advisors – business leaders, and prominent academics. Its purpose is to assess U.S. priorities, opportunities, and constraints in the new vastly different post-Cold War environment. Mr. Greenberg’s paper makes an important contribution to this objective.
Dimitri K. Simes
President
The Risk of Global Recession
The current global financial crisis is among the greatest challenges to the world economy since the end of World War II. Unlike past financial crises, which were confined to particular regions, the current financial contagion is quickly spreading across continents. Unless action is taken in the next few months to shore up faltering countries and restore confidence in the global economy, the world will face a deep and prolonged recession.
G-7 countries, in particular the United States, were slow to realize the scope and seriousness of the crisis, which began in Thailand in the summer of 1997. For example, at the 1997 G-7 summit in Denver, Japan proposed the establishment of a $100 billion Asian fund to help deal with the crisis. The U.S., however, opposed the plan for fear it would undermine the IMF’s more limited rescue program and out of concern over the implications of a Japan-led effort. Only after U.S. stock markets experienced a sharp downturn this past summer did Americans wake up to the crisis. Though economic and political leaders throughout the world now acknowledge the seriousness of the situation, a combination of politically weak governments and lack of consensus has prevented quick and decisive action on the part of the instrialized nations.
The IMF Is Still Critical, But Its Focus Must Change
With the global economy teetering on the brink, now is not the time to abandon existing international institutions in search of new, unproven mechanisms. Aid through the International Monetary Fund remains the best means to stabilize financial markets. However, the approach taken by the IMF to date has failed to turn the tide. Strict conditions imposed by the Fund have forced recipient countries to raise interest rates and lower budget deficits even as they face recession. In many cases, looser fiscal and monetary policies are needed to increase demand and stimulate growth.
The IMF was created in 1945 with a mission to stabilize currencies, not to restructure economies. To fight this present crisis, the IMF must get out of the business of managing entire economies and instead concentrate on recing exchange rate fluctuations. Conditions for recipient countries should focus more narrowly on banking transparency. Countries in need of IMF loans should be expected to adopt internationally accepted accounting standards, pass adequate bankruptcy legislation, and proce a clear and thorough accounting of foreign debt. In other aspects of fiscal, trade, and monetary policy, however, recipients should be given more latitude to set their own policies to maintain growth.
The United States must continue to contribute its share to the IMF. By withholding funds, the U.S. only reces its influence and its ability to convince the IMF to change its tactics. Congressional approval of the $18 billion replenishment should encourage other nations to follow suit. The U.S. contribution of $18 billion will thus mobilize $90 billion, a substantial sum the IMF should use solely for currency stabilization. Japan has revised its proposal for an Asia-based stabilization fund, this time pledging $30 billion instead of the original $100 billion. Japan, however, should be encouraged to make this money available to the IMF through the General Agreements to Borrow (GAB) so the IMF will remain the main distributor of funds.
Small Countries Need Relief From Currency Speculation
Smaller countries like Thailand are unable to defend themselves against international currency speculators, many of whom control billions of dollars. Managers of huge hedge funds often sell short simultaneously on a country’s currency and stock markets. When smaller economies are the target of such speculation, these short positions can become self-fulfilling prophecies. China and India have both limited their exposure to the financial turmoil because their currencies are not freely convertible and thus not subject to speculation. While shorting of the dollar or the pound, even by the largest currency speculators, would have little effect on Britain or the U.S., smaller economies have no means to defend themselves.
Unrestricted speculation is working to kill free-market thinking in many developing and newly developed nations. Some countries should be allowed to outlaw certain types of short selling and to place some controls on short-term portfolio investments. There is nothing wrong with imposing penalties on investors who buy in and then pull out of a market on the same day. In this sense, the Hong Kong government’s recent intervention in the stock market is justified. Such measures do not violate free market principles when the aim is to combat certain kinds of speculative trading.
Japan: Both Problem and Solution
The world financial crisis will not improve until Japan, the world’s second largest economy and Asia’s biggest market, returns to the path of economic growth. Though Tokyo’s offers of financial aid to its neighbors are welcome, Japan can only give real help to Asia by boosting its own domestic demand. Japan’s lingering economic malaise has exacerbated currency fluctuations. The yen has gone from ?0/$ a few years ago to ?47 this past August. In the week of October 5 alone, the yen suddenly strengthened from ?34 to ?17. Such fluctuation by a major world currency has grave consequences. This volatility makes it impossible for businesses to do any meaningful planning and is delaying Asia’s recovery. The problems in the Japanese economy thus jeopardize everyone’s economic security, not just Japan’s.
Perhaps no other instrialized country (with the obvious exception of Russia and some of the emerging markets undergoing major transitions) has suffered from worse political paralysis than Japan. Despite years of stagnant growth, Japan’s leaders have been unable clean up their country’s decrepit banks. On October 3, Bank of Japan Governor Masaru Hayami told Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan that many of Japan’s banks do not meet the 8% capital reserve standard set by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). If true, this means that Japanese banks do not have adequate capital reserves to operate internationally.
United States officials should privately, but firmly, insist that the Japanese government guarantee that their banks meet the 8% BIS standard or Japanese banks will no longer be allowed to operate in America. Mr. Hayami’s statement appears to have been a deliberate move to get the United States to put more pressure on Japan’s politicians to deal with the banking crisis. A more hard-line stance by Washington would be useful because it would give Japanese leaders the political cover to initiate tough reforms. Once the necessary reform measures pass the Diet, including a bankruptcy law, then the Japanese public may be more willing to allow the government to use some of the money in Japan’s huge postal savings system to help the banks.
Leadership Needed, Not Cure-Alls
Though the present crisis is often referred to as the "financial contagion," in reality it is not a single disease with a single cure. Each country has its own unique set of difficulties and the solutions for each country will be different. South Korea, for example, is still running a healthy trade surplus and enjoys $43 billion in foreign currency reserves, money which could be used to purchase the stock of ailing companies. This would help to revitalize the companies by providing capital at the rate of the day and would provide incentives for foreign banks to convert debt into equity. In Thailand, meanwhile, the government can later dispose of the shares they own in an orderly fashion in the market. The Thai government has much lower foreign exchange reserves. Banks are still paralyzed, but signs are emerging that they are raising new local funds. Thai companies are having difficulty getting trade financing. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Russia are now facing deep political and social problems that cannot be solved through financial means alone.
A global lack of investor confidence is at the heart of the current problem. Once investor confidence is lost, it is very hard to restore. Time should not be wasted debating what new institutions or global financial regimes are needed for the future. Rather, all energy must be spent finding solutions to the present situation. Both the instrialized nations and the IMF must not dictate overly strict conditions for aid that will rece demand and economic growth in the recipient countries. The G-7 members will need to maintain demand in their own economies. A lowering of interest rates in Europe would help, but interest rate cuts alone will not head off an economic slowdown without additional remedies as described above. Together these actions would help to restore investor confidence.
The only way out of the financial crisis is for the United States to show leadership. For its part, the Congress was wise to approve funding for the IMF. After that, the initiative must come from the White House. A positive step would be for President Clinton to oversee the formation of a special commission, preferably composed of experts from all G-7 nations, which would travel to each country to study and recommend country-specific solutions. The IMF is a useful lender of last resort, but it is not equipped to build a new global financial architecture. Such an endeavor requires not only economic expertise but political effort as well. It is beyond the mandate of the IMF; thus, the G-7 should assume a leadership role. Failure to act quickly will carry the risk of plunging the world into a downward spiral that could turn into a recession or worse.
参考资料：http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/Perspectives/greenberg3_5.htm
