博弈论的相关问题,完美价格歧视以及纳什均衡。

发布网友发布时间：2023-05-11 04:05

共1个回答

热心网友时间：2024-12-03 06:39

(a) Pi=(0.2(2-p)+0.8(3-p))(p-1)
FOC: 3.8-2p=0 (First-order condition)
p=1.9
Pi=0.81 (profit)

(b) Market 1: Pi=(2-p)(p-1)
FOC: p=1.5
Pi=0.25

Market 2: Pi=(3-p)(p-1)
FOC: p=2

Pi=1
Pi=0.2*0.25+0.8*1=0.85

(c) 区分两类消费者，强制接受对应的价格。（貌似有三条，自己去书上翻定义）
后面两问不确定。

帮我检查下数学。

2.

Betty
1000 2000 3000

1000 100,0 100,0 100,0
Wilma 2000 0,100 1100,0 1100,0
3000 0,100 0,1100 2100,0

No dominant strategy for both players.
Strategy 3000 for Betty is weakly dominated. But the game cannot be solved by iterated deletion, since 3000 is only weakly dominated.

Pure strategy Nash equilibrium: (100,0)
If you really want mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, please send a message to me